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1. My Lords, we are all aware that the problem of undue influence in 
mortgage transactions is a serious one.  It is serious for people who are 
pressured into a financial commitment they do not want.  It is serious for 
lenders who want to be able to rely on their legal rights under a contract.  
And it is serious because it happens a lot.  When this House last 
considered the matter, in Barclays Bank v O’Brien [1993] 4 All ER 417, 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson noted that there had been no fewer than eleven 
decisions on this matter in eight years.  In that landmark decision, their 
Lordships not only acknowledged the potential liability of lenders for 
mortgage contracts obtained through the exercise of undue influence by 
one mortgagor upon another, they also laid down practical guidelines to 
enable lenders to avoid liability.  It was hoped that this would settle the 
question, but the reverse has happened.  Since then, the Court of Appeal 
has heard more than 20 undue influence cases, and they keep on coming.  
It is indicative of the extent of the problem that we are called upon today to 
decide no fewer than eight conjoined appeals, all involving wives alleging 
that they signed mortgage agreements under the undue influence of their 
husbands. 
The O’Brien Guidelines 
2. When Lord Browne-Wilkinson gave the decision of the House of Lords in 
O’Brien eight years ago, he explained that the challenge before the courts 
was to provide not simply an analysis of the law but a set of workable 
guidelines for lenders which would balance the important function of 
releasing capital for business purposes on the security of the family home 
with the protection of vulnerable wives from exploitation by their husbands.  
He gave considerable attention to equity’s longstanding role in the 
protection of married women, for centuries disadvantaged in law and now, 
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though formally equal, still disadvantaged in terms of access to economic 
resources.  After lengthy examination of the case law, however, he 
rejected the need for a ‘special equity’ or automatic presumption of undue 
influence in the case of married women, though he readily accepted that 
‘the risk of undue influence affecting a voluntary disposition by a wife in 
favour of a husband is greater than in the ordinary run of cases where no 
sexual or emotional ties affect the free exercise of the individual’s will’ (at 
424).  I would add here that sexual or emotional ties are not the only 
factors affecting the free exercise of a wife’s will: there may also be social 
or even physical pressure (or the threat of it) or economic dependence 
upon the husband so great as to make disagreement with his wishes a 
practical impossibility.  
3. Whilst accepting the greater risk of undue influence to married women, 
and couching the whole of his opinion in terms of ‘wives’ and ‘husbands’ 
(a style replicated, I note, in the opinions of your Lordships in the present 
case), Lord Browne-Wilkinson emphasised that the equity should, in line 
with social change, be equally available to unmarried cohabitants, 
including same-sex couples, as well as people in other relationships 
where one party reposes ‘trust and confidence’ in the other.   
4. By declining to make married women a special case requiring special 
protection, the House of Lords in O’Brien reinforced an important point of 
principle: that of the equality of the sexes and the irrelevance of marital 
status in the application of legal and equitable principles.  This is, I am 
sure, correct, for differential treatment has usually proved to be an 
impediment to the advancement of women.  But the knowledge that 
women enjoy formal equality should not blind us to the fact that almost all 
the case law concerns married women and that, for historical, social, and 
cultural reasons, there are special pressures upon women in marriage.  As 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson wisely observed: ‘although the concept of the 
ignorant wife leaving all financial decisions to the husband is outmoded, 
the practice does not yet coincide with the ideal’.  He went on: 
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“In a substantial proportion of marriages it is still the husband who 
has the business experience and the wife is willing to follow his 
advice without bringing a truly independent mind and will to bear on 
financial decisions.  The number of recent cases in this field shows 
that many wives are still subjected to, and yield to, undue influence 
by their husbands.  Such women can reasonably look to the law for 
some protection when their husbands have abused the trust and 
confidence reposed in them’ (at 422). 
The guidelines in practice 
5. The rule laid down in O’Brien for the protection of these wives was that a 
lender would automatically be put on notice if (1) the proposed mortgage 
was manifestly not to the wife’s financial advantage, and (2) there was a 
substantial risk that the husband had obtained his wife’s consent through 
undue influence or negligent misrepresentation (at 429).  Lenders could 
avoid being fixed with constructive notice of undue influence by 
conducting a personal interview with the wife in which they made clear to 
her the risk she was running and advised her to take independent legal 
advice. 
6. Lord Browne-Wilkinson clearly anticipated resistance from banks and 
building societies to the extra duties thenceforth expected from them.  He 
noted that ‘Mr Jarvis QC for the bank urged that this is to impose too 
heavy a burden on financial institutions.  I am not impressed by this 
submission’ (at 430).  He regarded the personal interview as essential for 
the wife’s protection because ‘a number of decided cases show that 
written warnings are often not read and are sometimes intercepted by the 
husband’ (at 431).  Such is the power of the nation’s lending industry, 
however, that the requirement of a personal interview with the wife was 
never adopted.  Lenders continued to use their existing Code of Banking 
Practice according to which wives were advised to seek independent legal 
advice as to the nature and effect of the transaction, and banks received 
the solicitor’s confirmation that they had been so advised.  They avoided 
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the requirement of the interview because, as Stuart-Smith LJ frankly 
observed in this case in the Court of Appeal (,, it was ‘likely to expose the 
bank to far greater risks than those from which it wishes to be protected’. 
7. This state of affairs was, I am afraid, tolerated by the courts.  By the time 
the appeals in the current proceedings reached the Court of Appeal, 
lenders had succeeded in shifting the entire burden of ensuring that the 
wife’s consent was freely obtained to the solicitors they instructed to 
advise her.  Lenders were not required to be concerned with the quality of 
the advice those solicitors gave, or even whether it had been given at all.  
They were entitled to assume that the advising solicitor had acted 
independently, professionally and competently – even though, in the very 
series of cases in which these principles were laid down, many solicitors 
quite evidently had not done so.  They were entitled to go ahead and 
process the transaction without waiting for the solicitor to confirm that the 
advice had been provided.   This was the position we had reached when 
the eight appeals presently under discussion came to this House. 
8. I do not think that this was a satisfactory state of affairs.  The purpose of 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s guidelines was to ensure that banks took a 
modicum of care when lending to businessmen on the security of the 
family home.  That care had been so reduced as to be virtually non-
existent.  A bank could discharge its duty to a surety-wife simply by 
including a sentence in a standard communication advising her to take 
independent legal advice.  In fact, it was worse: in UCB Home Loans Corp 
Ltd v Moore (one of the appeals before this House), the Court of Appeal 
held itto be sufficient that a lender reasonably believed that a wife had 
received advice from an independent legal adviser, even when the lender 
did not request it and did not require a confirmatory letter from the 
solicitor.   
9.  
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New guidelines 
10. I therefore welcome the new guidelines laid down by my noble and 
learned friend Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, whose opinion I have had the 
advantage of reading in draft, as to the steps that lenders need to take to 
avoid being fixed with constructive notice of undue influence, and the 
duties of solicitors in advising sureties in these kinds of actions.  I agree, 
too, with his widening of the categories of relationships to which automatic 
protection will be available to all those which are ‘non-commercial’ in 
character.  Reform was clearly needed, and implementation of these 
guidelines should provide a solution to many of the problems we have 
experienced up till now. 
11. There will no doubt be protests from both lenders and solicitors that the 
new guidelines impose duties too onerous, responsibilities too great.  We 
have heard this many times before. I well remember the cries of anguish 
from conveyancing solicitors following Williams & Glyn’s Bank v Boland 
[1981] AC 487 when it became clear that they could no longer assume 
that the lady of the house had no separate interest in the property, and 
that they would have to ask her about her rights, lest their client be caught 
by her overriding interest.  Too much work, they said!  Too costly!  And 
embarrassing, too, because they would need to enquire about the lady’s 
relationship to the legal owner.  But the House of Lords of the time were 
not deterred.  Lord Wilberforce pointed out that ‘What is involved is a 
departure from an easy-going practice of dispensing with enquiries as to 
occupation beyond that of the vendor and accepting the risks of doing so’ 
(at 508).  Lord Scarman described the difficulties anticipated as 
‘exaggerated’: ‘solicitors exist to provide the service which the public 
needs.  They can – as they have successfully done in the past – adjust 
their practice, if it be socially required’ (at 510).   That is exactly what 
happened: they adjusted their practice.  Twenty years on, we hear no 
more complaints about the intolerable burden, and we see no evidence 
that mortgagees or solicitors have suffered, financially or in any other way.   
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12.  In the lamentable series of undue influence cases before us, however, the 
co-owner wife continues to be cast as an impediment to the smooth 
running of the mortgage industry – a clog in the wheel of capitalism – just 
as she was in Boland. The cases have much in common, for having to 
make separate enquiries of a wife is a similar kind of conveyancing burden  
to having to give her separate advice.  It was so much easier when 
property was held by men alone, and wives’ interests could be ignored.  
But if the gender equality that Lord Browne-Wilkinson stressed is to be 
truly supported, then wives must be treated with respect.  Their priorities 
are often different from those of husbands and mortgagees.  Too often, it 
seems to me, those priorities disappear from the case narratives because 
they are seen as irrelevant to the ‘real’ issues.  Too often their interests 
are unthinkingly elided with those of their husbands, as they used to be in 
the family home cases before Boland.  This may be because most English 
j judges find it hard to imagine what a woman’s life is like.  But there is 
another reason.  It is clearly easier for the mortgage industry to operate on 
the basis that wives only want what their husbands want, and the courts 
have been reluctant to interfere. 
13.  Whenever it is suggested that banks and building societies should show 
more responsibility in their lending practices, the institutions respond by 
threatening to withhold or limit easy access to capital.  The fact that this 
has never actually occurred has not prevented the courts, in the years 
since O’Brien, from being perhaps excessively careful not to tread on the 
lenders’ toes.  As a consequence, mortgages are more freely and casually 
available than ever before.  That businesses should be able to raise 
capital on the security of the family home is regarded as axiomatic.  I note 
that your Lordships accept it without question.  I, however, do not.  Is 
lending on the scale and of the sort we see in the case law so obviously 
defensible?  Most, if not all, of the wives before us would rather have kept 
their homes than take the kinds of risks their husbands took. Yet the 
courts have been zealous to ensure that equity’s role of protecting the 
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weak and vulnerable is subordinated to the requirements of business.  
The duty of care has not been allowed to curtail the free availability of 
capital raised on the security of the home.   
14.  If these cases tell us anything, it is that lenders are too careless in the 
dispensing of their funds to businesses.  To those who say that it is not the 
role of the courts to stop them – that this is a matter of government policy, 
and the solution lies in the hands of Parliament – I would reply that this 
House should certainly express its disquiet about the way things are 
going. It ill behoves the judiciary to bow to pressure from commercial 
interests as I believe it has done.  The law should by all means try to 
facilitate the smooth and safe transfer of loan moneys into worthy projects.  
But let us not absolve the lender of every element of risk.  Some of the 
burden must fall on those who seek to gain the most. Likewise, some of 
the court’s protection must be reserved for those who need it most: the 
wives, who have so much to lose.  Otherwise the ‘balance’ of which so 
many judges have spoken, echoing Lord Browne-Wilkinson in O’Brien, is 
an empty term, for it is so heavily weighted in favour of the lenders and 
against the surety wives. 
The appeals 
15. I turn now to the eight substantive appeals.  As far as five of them are 
concerned, I am in agreement with your Lordships as to the outcome.  I 
would allow the appeals of Mrs Harris, Mrs Wallace, Mrs Moore and Mrs 
Bennett, for the reasons given by my noble and learned friends Lord 
Nicholls of Birkenhead and Lord Scott of Foscote.  I note, however, that 
Mrs Harris died in March of this year.  I do not see how Mr Harris can 
continue resisting the bank’s claim for possession of his home on the 
basis of his own undue influence over his wife.  This would hardly comply 
with the equitable maxim about clean hands, even as relaxed by this court 
in Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340.  To succeed, Mr Harris would be 
forced to rely on his own wrongdoing, and that is not permitted.  I would 
also allow the appeal of Desmond Banks & Co, though with some regret.  I 
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accept that here there is no evidence that the solicitor did not discharge 
his duty, such as it was at the time, to Mrs Kenyon-Brown.  I would note, 
however, that, had the guidelines devised by my noble and learned 
colleague Lord Nicholls been in force at the relevant time, that duty would 
have been a more rigorous one and Mrs Kenyon-Brown might well have 
succeeded in obtaining damages from the solicitor to the extent of her loss 
. 
Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge 
16. On the other three appeals I must respectfully disagree with your 
Lordships.   I shall begin with Mrs Etridge, who has the misfortune to give 
her name to what may well come to be seen as a case laying down a fair 
and important point of law, but one from which she will not herself benefit.  
This is the sixth court in which aspects of her case have been argued, 
from the original claim for possession by the bank, through three Court of 
Appeal judgments and a re-trial, to the present hearing.  There were two 
claims in Mrs Etridge’s case: first, that the unlimited bank charge to which 
Mrs Etridge agreed should be set aside because of presumed undue 
influence; and second, that Mrs Etridge was entitled to damages from the 
solicitors who failed to advise her as to the true nature of the documents 
she signed. 
17. In 1988 the Etridges purchased a new family home, the Old Rectory, with 
funds raised partly from the sale of their old home, Harewood House, and 
partly from loans from the Royal Bank of Scotland and a separate trust 
fund.  Both loans, as well as an overdraft facility for Mr Etridge’s business, 
were secured by charges on the Old Rectory.  The bank asked their own 
solicitors to explain the effect of the charges to Mrs Etridge, who was the 
legal owner of  the Old Rectory, before obtaining her signature.  The 
nominated solicitor obtained the signature but, as the evidence 
established, gave her no explanation of the charge; he told the bank, 
however, that he had.  Mrs Etridge subsequently claimed to have had no 
idea that the document she signed was a legal charge and no idea of its 
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extent.  Mr Etridge fell behind with the mortgage repayments and both the 
trustees and the bank sought possession of the Old Rectory.  Mrs Etridge 
resisted possession on the ground that her consent to the mortgage had 
been obtained through her husband’s undue influence and contended that 
the bank were fixed with constructive notice of that undue influence since 
she had received no advice whatsoever as to the nature and effect of the 
transaction she was entering into. 
18.  Possession was granted but, on appeal, the Court of Appeal held in Royal 
Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No 1) [1997] 3 All ER 628 that the solicitor 
was the agent of the bank for the purpose of giving advice to Mrs Etridge 
and thus his knowledge of the fact that he had not given that advice must 
be imputed to the bank.  On a re-trial, however, His Honour Judge 
Behrens ordered possession on the ground that the bank were entitled to 
rely on the solicitor’s confirmation that he had given the appropriate 
advice.  This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc v Etridge (No 2) [1998] 4 All ER 705.  Mrs Etridge appeals to 
this House against that decision and also against the decision of a 
different Court of Appeal in Etridge v Pritchard Englefield [1999] PNLR 
839 that the solicitors, while negligent in failing to advise her, owed her 
only nominal damages, as she would have entered into the transaction 
even if she had received proper advice.  
Presumption of undue influence 
19. Judge Behrens at first instance found no evidence of actual undue 
influence but accepted that the presumption of undue influence arose 
because of the relationship of ‘trust and confidence’ between Mrs Etridge 
and her husband and because she left all financial decisions to him.  My 
noble and learned friend Lord Scott of Foscote (in a speech I have been 
privileged to read in draft) has been critical of the way the judge and the 
Court of Appeal dealt with the presumption of undue influence.  With 
respect, I have difficulty accepting his argument.  Lord Scott says that, if 
the judge finds no evidence of undue influence, then the presumption is 
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rebutted.  That is not how I understand presumptions to work.  The 
presumption of undue influence exists precisely to deal with those 
situations where evidence of actual undue influence is hard to find, but 
where there are nevertheless reasons to doubt that the consent of the 
surety has been freely obtained.  Lord Scott says there is no undue 
influence here because there was no evidence of abuse by Mr Etridge of 
the couple’s relationship or of bullying of Mrs Etridge in order to persuade 
her to support his decisions.  That may be so; but that was not the point. 
Where the presumption of undue influence arises – as the judge accepted 
it did in this case – then the onus is shifted to the presumed influencer to 
demonstrate that undue influence was not present.  It is not up to the 
alleged victim, or indeed the judge, to find evidence of actual undue 
influence. I see no evidence from Mr Etridge rebutting the presumption.  It 
is one thing for a husband to handle the family finances, quite another for 
him to conceal from his wife, whose consent he needed for a further 
plunge into unnecessary risk (they did not need to buy a new house), the 
extent of the proposed borrowing and his existing indebtedness.  The 
presumption of undue influence might have been rebutted by evidence 
that Mrs Etridge gave her consent in full knowledge of what she was 
doing.  That knowledge could have come from her own understanding of 
the transaction, from her husband, the bank, or the solicitor.  But Mrs 
Etridge did not have full knowledge; her husband had deliberately withheld 
relevant facts from her, and no one else told her.   
Manifest disadvantage 
20.   In his excellent analysis of the law, my noble and learned friend Lord 
Nicholls has finally laid to rest the debate about whether the transaction 
must be to the ‘manifest disadvantage’ of the complainant for a 
presumption of undue influence to arise. It is enough for the surety to be in 
a non-commercial relationship with the principal debtor for the 
presumption to arise.  Disadvantage remains, however, evidentially 
relevant to establishing whether the presumption has been rebutted.  
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Unfortunately, ‘manifest disadvantage’ has frequently been interpreted in 
ways that betray a lack of understanding of (or sympathy with) the 
priorities of the wives in these cases.  In Mrs Etridge’s case, the trial judge 
and the Court of Appeal were united in finding that this transaction was not 
of manifest disadvantage to her, a view shared by my noble and learned 
friends Lord Nicholls and Lord Scott.  While there were some aspects 
which were clearly disadvantageous, there were others which, they say, 
were advantageous.  Without the loans from the bank and the trust, the 
Etridges would not have been able to purchase their new home.  And 
while the bank charge was an unlimited one (and thus on the face of it 
disadvantageous), this was no different from the charge that the bank had 
held over the old family home.  Moreover, it allowed money to be injected 
into Mr Etridge’s business, upon whose profits the family lived. 
21. I must respectfully differ from this assessment of the disadvantage to Mrs 
Etridge of this transaction.  The judge at first instance accepted that she 
had no idea she was creating charges over the new house (just as she 
had not known that a charge existed over the old house) and was ‘wholly 
unaware’ of the extent of Mr Etridge’s existing liabilities.  It should also be 
noted that Harewood House was sold for £240,000, while the Old Rectory 
was purchased for £505,000.   There was, therefore, a great deal more 
money to lose should the bank call in its unlimited charge on the new 
property by comparison with the old. 
22. Mrs Etridge was, in short, in total ignorance of the fact that she was in 
imminent danger of losing her home should her husband’s business fail.  I 
am sure she knew that the bank could possess and sell the property if the 
couple defaulted on the mortgage repayments – everyone knows that – 
but she clearly had no idea of the likelihood that this would happen.  In the 
event, the Etridges defaulted within 18 months, which demonstrates only 
too clearly how precarious their financial situation was at the time of the 
conveyance, and how a sensible person in full knowledge of the facts 
might well have refused to agree to its terms. 
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23. Was Mrs Etridge such a ‘sensible person’?  From the facts, she was a 
woman who conformed to the social mores of the time and place in which 
she grew up and married.  She was born in 1938 – that is, before the 
second world war, when ideas of women’s role were very different from 
today’s.  She trained and worked as a physiotherapist before her 
marriage, in 1970, at the age of 32.  For a short while she ran a restaurant 
with her husband.  Then the children arrived – four of them, born between 
1971 and 1977 – and she gave up work to devote herself to domestic and 
family life.  With four children so close together she would have had her 
hands full when they were young.  At the time of the events in this case, 
the children were aged between eleven and 17 – a very demanding stage, 
as any parent of teenagers will tell you.  At this age they are out and about 
and busy with a thousand different activities, but not yet fully independent.  
They must be ferried from place to place.  They need help with their 
school work, their social lives, the problems of growing up.  With her 
husband preoccupied with his business, Mrs Etridge would have done the 
lion’s share of the parenting and homemaking – a full-time job. 
24.  The breadwinning role was Mr Etridge’s.  He was a businessman – that 
was his calling and his area of expertise – and the family lived off his 
earnings.  Mrs Etridge was neither uneducated nor unintelligent.  She had 
had many years of earning her own money in a professional occupation.  
But she was not a businesswoman.  For that reason, it made perfect 
sense to allow her husband to make all financial decisions.  He had 
always provided for the family; she had no reason not to trust his 
judgment.  She knew she was the legal owner of Harewood House, the 
house they were selling, and also that the Old Rectory, the house they 
were purchasing, was to be transferred into her name, for business 
reasons; she knew, therefore, that she must sign the documents of 
conveyance.  She knew that a mortgage of £100,000 had been arranged 
and there would be papers to sign for that.  But she did not read the 
documents because she thought she knew the contents and she would 
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probably not understand the obscure language in which they were 
couched in any event.   Her behaviour was, therefore, both rational and 
unexceptional.  She agreed to the legal charge because she thought that 
the chances of the bank calling in its loan were minimal and that, even if it 
did so, the charge was limited to £100,000.  She thought this because 
nobody told her otherwise.   
25.  There is a wider principle at stake.  When we talk of the ‘advantage’ of 
obtaining funds for the development of businesses, even those that 
provide the family income, we tend to forget that those funds are usually 
raised on the security, not of any old property, but of the family home.  I 
need hardly reiterate – but I will, since it is so often overlooked – that a 
home has a particular significance for someone who, like Mrs Etridge, is a 
homemaker.  It is not simply the domestic heart of the family and a shelter 
against the elements.  It is her domain – hers, not his.  Mr Etridge had his 
business affairs to occupy him.  Mrs Etridge’s job was to run the home.  I 
doubt that she would wilfully have put that at risk.  Most people have 
mortgages and most people expect to have a limited indebtedness to a 
bank at some stage in their lives.  But Mrs Etridge knew that she and her 
husband had put considerable equity into the new house, and it seems to 
me inconceivable that the combined effect of this particular transaction – 
the potential loss of all their capital as well as their home – was something 
she would have contemplated with equanimity.  It was a transaction that 
was manifestly disadvantageous to her.  For this reason, and in light of the 
lack of any other evidence to do so, the presumption of undue influence 
was not rebutted. 
Constructive notice 
26. There remains the question of whether the bank were fixed with 
constructive notice of the undue influence affecting Mrs Etridge’s signature 
of the loan guarantee.  The bank requested Robert Gore & Co, the 
solicitors they had instructed to act for them, to explain the contents and 
effect of the legal charge to Mrs Etridge and to confirm to the bank that 
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she understood the same by signing the legal advice clause prior to 
witnessing her signature. In fact the duty solicitor, Mr Ellis, did not explain 
the contents and effect of the documents to Mrs Etridge – but he told the 
bank that he had. 
27. The Court of Appeal held that the bank were ‘entitled to assume that the 
solicitors had discharged their professional duties to Mrs Etridge whether 
or not [they] had actually seen the certificate indorsed on the respective 
legal charges before authorising the release of the money’ (at para.22). In 
this case, the bank did not bother to wait for the solicitor’s certificate 
before releasing the money.  The certificate eventually came, falsely 
testifying that Mrs Etridge had received advice when, it fact, she had not.  
But by then completion had taken place.  My noble and learned friend 
Lord Scott holds that, because the bank knew that there were solicitors 
acting for Mrs Etridge (albeit solicitors instructed by the bank), and 
because those solicitors assured the bank that they had advised her about 
the content and effect of the legal charge, the bank were entitled to be 
satisfied they were safe in relying on her apparent consent.  In my view, if 
the bank paid out the money without waiting for the solicitor’s assurance 
that she had been properly advised, they cannot be said to have relied on 
this assurance and they cannot be said to have avoided being fixed with 
constructive notice of any undue influence. It is irrelevant that the 
solicitor’s certificate, when it arrived, was a meaningless fabrication. In my 
view, the bank were fixed with constructive notice of the presumed undue 
influence because they acted without confirmation that the consent had 
been freely given, and Mrs Etridge is entitled to have the charge set aside. 
28.  In making this finding, I am aware that I am departing from a substantial 
body of Court of Appeal jurisprudence, as well as the opinions of your 
Lordships in this House.   In my view, however, if the purpose of the 
equitable rule is to try to ensure that consent is freely obtained, then the 
least a lender can do is to refrain from acting until they have been told that 
advice has been given and the surety understands what she is doing.  I 
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accept that the bank cannot be bound by information they do not know – 
for instance, that the solicitor’s advice had been poor (or non-existent) – 
since whether the bank has notice of undue influence can only be 
determined by how the transaction appears to them, as Stuart-Smith LJ 
explained in this case in the Court of Appeal (at para.41).  But 
‘constructive notice’, whether or not one accepts that this particular 
jurisdiction falls within the ambit of s.199 Law of Property Act 1925 (as 
Stuart-Smith LJ did), requires that the party who wishes to escape it at 
least ascertains that the appropriate inquiries have been answered.  One 
cannot be excused from constructive notice by simply passing the buck to 
a solicitor or by recklessly going ahead with the transaction without waiting 
for confirmation from the advising solicitor. 
Negligence 
29. Mrs Etridge’s second claim relates to the negligence of the solicitors who 
said they had advised her as the nature and effect of the legal charge she 
agreed to, but who did not do so.  As a consequence of Mrs Etridge’s 
successful appeal against possession by the bank in Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc v Etridge (No 1) [1997] 3 All ER 628, Robert Gore & Co (by 
this time merged with another firm, Pritchard Englefield) amended their 
defence to admit, as Mrs Etridge had argued all along, their liability to Mrs 
Etridge for breach of duty.  On the re-trial, Judge Behrens found that the 
solicitors were in breach but that, on the balance of probabilities, Mrs 
Etridge would have signed the two charges even if she had had a full 
explanation of their content and effect.  He awarded her nominal damages 
of £2. 
30. Following the Court of Appeal’s decision in the present case, Mrs Etridge 
sought leave to appeal on the negligence issue on the basis that the 
solicitor owed a wider duty to the surety than that which had been 
previously been considered.  She contended that, given the manifest 
disadvantage of the transactions and her husband’s existing 
indebtedness, the only proper advice the solicitor could have given was 
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that she should not sign the documents relating to the sale of Harewood 
House, the purchase of the Old Rectory and the legal charges.  Had he 
done so, she submitted, she would not have agreed to any of the 
transactions.  In Etridge v Pritchard Englefield [1999] PNLR 839 the Court 
of Appeal refused permission to amend her notice of appeal on the ground 
that the proposed amendments would introduce new arguments that had 
not been considered in the court below.   
31.  Morritt LJ (May and Tuckey LJJ agreeing) further held that Judge 
Behrens had been entitled on the evidence to conclude that Mrs Etridge 
would have signed the documents whatever advice she had been given.  
Because of a delay between the sale of the old house and the purchase of 
the new, the family had been given permission to continue to reside in the 
old home until completion on the new – but completion was dependent 
upon the signing of the charge.  The ‘exigencies’ of the situation – the fact 
that the Etridges would have lost their deposit and the family would be 
homeless – would, the court considered, have impelled Mrs Etridge to 
agree to the charge. 
32. I find it difficult to see how this finding was arrived at.  It is true that, had 
Mrs Etridge refused to go ahead with the purchase of the Old Rectory, 
they would have lost their deposit of £50,505 – not a small sum by any 
means. But it pales into insignificance by comparison with the sum they 
eventually lost by entering into the purchase of a house worth ten times as 
much.  As for the issue of homelessness, I regret to say that I regard this 
kind of pronouncement as evidence for the oft-repeated assertion that the 
judiciary is out of touch with ordinary people.  If Mrs Etridge had refused to 
agree to the charge, the family would indeed have been without a home 
that they owned.  But many people in England and Wales do not own their 
own home.  What was there to stop the Etridges from renting for the time 
being?  It is not difficult to find rental property.  The rent payments, though 
doubtless substantial on a home large enough to accommodate a family of 
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six, would still have been less than the mortgage repayments on the Old 
Rectory. 
33.  For these reasons, I do not think that the case that Mrs Etridge would 
inevitably have agreed to the charge is made out.  Her refutation of the 
suggestion would have been further strengthened if the court had 
accepted, as she submitted, that the undue influence she suffered dated 
from the time of the sale of Harewood House, rather than from the date of 
the signing of the legal charge on the Old Rectory.  If the earlier date had 
been accepted, and she had been in a position to resist the sale of 
Harewood House, the issue of homelessness would not have arisen. 
34.  In any case, the nominal damages of £2 awarded to Mrs Etridge were 
clearly inadequate – the kind of award only made to wholly unworthy 
claims, which this was not.  Who knows whether Mrs Etridge would really 
have signed the legal charge if she had understood its full effect?  We can 
never know, because the situation did not arise.  She was not put to the 
test of having to choose between her own interests and inclinations and 
the wishes of her husband, because she was never given the opportunity.  
That being the case, it is at the very least patronising, and may even 
constitute evidence of actual undue influence, to assume she would have 
signed the document anyway, even in full possession of the facts.  
35.  The solicitors had a duty to advise her; they failed in that duty, and they 
have admitted their failure.  Lacking proper advice, and therefore in 
ignorance of what she was doing, Mrs Etridge signed the legal charge.  As 
a consequence of signing, she suffered serious loss.  To my mind, the 
case is clear.  I would allow her appeal and remit the matter to the trial 
judge for the assessment of damages. 
National Westminster Bank plc v Gill and another 
36. Mrs Gill’s husband wished to raise £100,000 secured on the family home 
to purchase new premises for his second-hand car business and 
associated business expenses.  Mrs Gill was enthusiastic about the new 
premises but reluctant to secure the loan on the family home.  She said in 
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evidence that she and her husband had a heated altercation about the 
matter.  However, following a private meeting arranged by the bank with 
the family solicitor, in which the nature and effect of a legal charge were 
explained to her, she agreed to the transaction. 
37. Unfortunately, both Mrs Gill and the solicitor were under the 
misapprehension – almost certainly implanted in their minds by Mr Gill – 
that the charge was limited to £36,000 (that being the amount needed to 
purchase the garage), rather than the £100,000 it actually was.  £36,000 
was, as Mrs Gill said, a sum they could easily afford.  £100,000 was not.  
In the event, the business failed to prosper and the bank sought 
possession of the family home.  Mrs Gill resisted possession on the 
ground that the bank had notice of the fact she had signed the documents 
under undue influence or as a result of misrepresentation by her husband. 
38.   The judge at first instance accepted that this was a case where there 
was a presumption of undue influence, but held that the bank were entitled 
to rely on the solicitor’s certificate of confirmation that he had advised her 
as requested by the bank.  Such advice having been given (and found in 
this case to have been competent), the bank were not fixed with 
constructive notice of any undue influence or misrepresentation.  The 
Court of Appeal agreed ([1998] 4 All ER 705).  In this House, too, my 
noble and learned friends Lord Nicholls and Lord Scott, whilst 
emphasising that lenders should inform solicitors advising wives of the 
amount of the proposed loan and of any existing indebtedness by the 
husband, nevertheless hold that the fact that the bank did not disclose this 
information here does not constitute a failure to take reasonable steps to 
ensure that Mrs Gill’s consent was not procured through undue influence 
or misrepresentation.  
39.  I must respectfully disagree.  Even if the adequacy of the legal advice is 
not a matter with which a bank should be concerned, since it must accept 
the solicitor’s confirmation at face value, the same cannot be said when 
the solicitor was prevented from giving proper advice by reason of the 
 19 
poor quality of his instructions from the bank.  How can a person who is 
not himself in full possession of the facts advise a client in any useful or 
meaningful way?  In this case, both solicitor and client imagined the 
charge to be limited to £36,000 rather than £100,000.  Their discussion 
would, therefore, have revolved around the pros and cons of signing in 
terms of a particular level of risk, when, unknown to them, the risk was 
much greater.  Not only was there more money to lose if the business 
failed to prosper, but the level of repayments that must be sustained to 
feed a mortgage of almost three times the envisaged amount would be 
very much higher.  This situation seems to me analogous to that of a 
junior doctor who, told to seek a patient’s consent before a routine 
operation, tells him or her that the risk of complications is relatively small, 
not knowing, because the surgeon has not told the junior doctor that this 
operation is not really routine, that its attendant risk will be much higher.  
Would the patient’s consent be viewed as truly free and informed in such 
circumstances?  I do not think so.  A hospital that allowed this to happen 
would not be considered to have discharged their duty of care to their 
patient.   
40. In Mrs Gill’s case, as in this example, the fault did not lie with the 
professional who advised her; he was as misinformed as his client.  The 
fault lay with the bank, who cannot be said to have taken all possible care 
to ensure that Mrs Gill’s consent was freely obtained.  I would therefore 
hold that the bank are fixed with notice of the undue influence or 
misrepresentation that may have induced Mrs Gill to enter into a 
transaction which, leading to the potential loss of her home – the thing she 
expressly feared – was clearly of manifest disadvantage to her.  
Accordingly, I would allow her appeal. 
Barclays Bank v Coleman 
41. I turn finally to the case of Mrs Coleman.  She was the joint legal owner of 
the family home in Clapton, East London.  Her husband, a diamond cutter, 
having lost his job, moved into property brokerage and then property 
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investment. In 1991 he bought two commercial properties in Hayes, 
Middlesex, and a half-share in an apartment block in Brooklyn, New York, 
the other half of which was owned by his wife’s brother.  The purchases 
were enabled by an ‘all-moneys’ charge on the family home.  An all-
moneys charge secures not only loans for property purchases but all 
future borrowings from the bank.  All three investments failed, for the 
income from rent was never sufficient to meet the liabilities.  In 1995 the 
bank sought to enforce their charge over the family home, and a 
possession order was granted. 
42. Both Mr and Mrs Coleman appealed against possession, and both were 
unsuccessful. Mr Coleman’s appeal need not concern us here.  Mrs 
Coleman contended that her consent to the charge had been obtained by 
reason of her husband’s undue influence and that the bank had not taken 
adequate steps to avoid being fixed with constructive notice of this.  His 
Honour Judge Wakefield, sitting in the Central London County Court, 
agreed that the bank had not taken adequate steps to ensure that Mrs 
Coleman’s consent had been freely obtained because, although she had 
received independent advice, it had been given by the solicitor’s managing 
clerk, a legal executive, not the solicitor himself.  In his view, however, the 
transaction had not been of ‘manifest disadvantage’ to Mrs Coleman and 
therefore undue influence was not established.  He said: 
‘Perhaps the best that can be said is that Mr Coleman’s departure 
from property broking to property speculation was a new departure 
and had risks which had not hitherto been undertaken by Mr 
Coleman.  However, notwithstanding those risks, I take the view 
that he was providing for his family’s livelihood’ (Barclays Bank plc 
v Coleman & another [2000] 1 All ER 385, at 400). 
43.  In the Court of Appeal, Nourse LJ (with whom Pill and Mummery LJJ 
agreed) took exactly the opposite view on both points.  On manifest 
disadvantage, after a lengthy analysis that prefigures this House’s 
rejection of the requirement, he concluded that Judge Wakefield’s view 
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was too narrow.  Counsel for Mrs Coleman in the Court of Appeal 
suggested several reasons why the transaction was disadvantageous to 
her client, including the fact that her husband had significant other assets 
so there was no need for the bank to impose a charge on the family home 
at all.  The factor that found favour with the Court of Appeal, and the 
rationale for their finding that the transaction had been of manifest 
disadvantage to Mrs Coleman, was the ‘all-moneys’ clause, which 
exposed her to unlimited risk.  If the mortgage on the family home was 
unnecessary, the all-moneys clause was gratuitous: a charge to the extent 
of the existing borrowings would have sufficed.  Mrs Coleman was 
therefore able to establish actual undue influence as against her husband.  
But this availed her little, since he was bankrupt. 
44.  The more serious question was whether the bank were fixed with notice 
of the undue influence.  Here again the Court of Appeal disagreed with 
Judge Wakefield.  They held that the bank were entitled to rely on the 
legal executive’s certificate of confirmation of advice given to Mrs 
Coleman because delegation to legal executives in solicitor’s firms was a 
widespread, normal and entirely proper practice. 
45.  Three features of this case call for further attention.  The first is the matter 
of the all-moneys charge.  These have featured repeatedly in the undue 
influence case law.  Yet it is almost impossible to envisage any situation in 
which a wife would freely agree to her home being used as security for an 
unlimited guarantee of her husband’s debts.  In almost every case, this 
would clearly be disadvantageous to her.  No solicitor with her interests at 
heart would advise a wife to sign such a charge.  No lender, if they 
thought about it, could seriously believe that a woman who did had done 
so of her own free will.  When the bank received Mrs Coleman’s signed 
charge, they should immediately have been put on notice that she had not 
been properly advised.  But of course these processes are so routine and 
normal, such thought would never have crossed the relevant official’s 
mind.  My view is that unlimited guarantees of this kind should not be used 
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in these circumstances.  If they ceased to be available – or were only 
employed in exceptional situations – then banks would have to adopt 
more prudent policies in regard to business loans, fewer homes might 
need to be repossessed, and we would not have to devote so much court 
time to these unfortunate undue influence cases. 
46. The second feature to note in this case is that, once again, the appointed 
legal officer claimed to have advised the wife, when in fact he had not.  
The trial evidence indicates that, in a meeting of very short duration, the 
managing clerk merely asked Mr Coleman if he had explained the 
documents to his wife and, on being assured that he had, requested Mrs 
Coleman’s signature.  The judge accepted this evidence; and it is perhaps 
for this reason that he held that the duty Lord Browne-Wilkinson imposed 
on lenders, to make sure that sureties received competent legal advice, 
should be delegated no further than to accredited solicitors.  Certainly 
what happened to Mrs Coleman was the very mischief that Lord Browne-
Wilkinson sought to avoid.  I do not wish to cast aspersions on all legal 
executives, many of whom are, I am sure, as knowledgeable and 
competent as many solicitors.  But the fact remains that legal executives 
are often employed to do the more routine, less contentious work of a 
solicitor’s practice.  The duty of explaining to a wife that, if she signs the 
documents her husband wants her to sign, she may lose her home, is, 
with respect, not a routine or uncontentious task.  It is one that should be 
reserved for qualified solicitors with their more rigorous training and wider 
experience of complex work.  I am in full agreement with the trial judge 
here, and would hold that the bank could not discharge their duty of care 
towards Mrs Coleman by accepting confirmation for advice given by a 
legal executive. 
47.  My finding is reinforced by the knowledge that there was so much in this 
case to put the bank on inquiry that undue influence might be present.  
This brings me to its third noteworthy feature.  The bank knew that Mr and 
Mrs Coleman were Hasidic Jews, with very traditional views as to the roles 
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of husband and wife.  In accordance with her religious principles, Mrs 
Coleman left business and financial decisions to her husband and 
concerned herself with domestic responsibilities. For that very reason, 
however, she would have been loath to expose her home to unnecessary 
risk.  She testified in court that, had she been given proper advice as to 
the meaning and effect of the legal charge, she would not have agreed to 
it.  My noble and learned friend Lord Scott doubts this. His view is that, for 
religious and cultural reasons, Mrs Coleman would have found it 
impossible to disagree with her husband.  He thinks she would have felt 
she had to do what he asked her to do.  Neither of us has the benefit of 
personal acquaintance with Mrs Coleman in order to form any assessment 
of her character and degree of subservience to her husband.  But she has 
certainly been prepared to say in court that she would have refused to go 
along with his plans, so either she is more independent-minded than my 
noble and learned friend Lord Scott allows, or she is only pleading undue 
influence because her husband put her up to it.  We do not know the truth 
of the matter.  But I do not think it is for this court to make assumptions 
about how individuals will behave based on a general and incomplete 
knowledge of religious and cultural norms.  The trial judge, who saw the 
witnesses, accepted that Mrs Coleman would normally go along with her 
husband’s wishes.  But this was partly because it was necessary to 
demonstrate a relationship of ‘trust and confidence’ to establish presumed 
undue influence.  She might not have done so in this case, where her 
home was at stake and there were other assets against which to secure 
the loans.  As with Mrs Etridge, we shall never know, since she was never 
given an opportunity to make an informed choice.   
48.  In my view, then, the bank were clearly put on notice that undue influence 
was possible in this case.  Undue influence was, in fact, found. By 
accepting written confirmation from the solicitor’s managing clerk, a legal 
executive, rather than the instructed solicitor himself, the bank failed to 
take adequate steps to ensure that Mrs Coleman’s consent was freely 
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obtained.  I hold that they are fixed with constructive notice of the undue 
influence and that she is entitled to have the charge set aside.  
Accordingly, I would allow her appeal. 
